CIRJE-F-955 | "Optimal Mechanism Design: Type-Independent Preference Orderings" |
Author Name | Matsushima, Hitoshi |
Date | February 2015 |
Full Paper | PDF file |
Remarks | Published in The Japanese Economic Review 69 (4), 2018. |
Abstract |
We investigate revenue maximization in general allocation problems with incomplete information, where we assume quasi-linearity, private values, independent type distributions, and single-dimensionality of type spaces. We require a mechanism to satisfy strategy-proofness and ex-post individual rationality. We assume that each player has a type-independent preference ordering over deterministic allocations. We show that the Myerson’s technique to solve the incentive-constrained revenue maximization problem in single-unit auctions can be applied to general allocation problems, where the incentive-constrained revenue maximization problem can be reduced to the simple maximization problem of the sum of players’ marginal revenues without imposing any incentive constraint. |